{"id":322576,"date":"2025-08-06T08:36:36","date_gmt":"2025-08-06T07:36:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/?p=322576"},"modified":"2025-08-06T08:45:50","modified_gmt":"2025-08-06T07:45:50","slug":"germany-and-the-eu-safeguarding-the-rule-of-law-in-troubled-times","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/?p=322576","title":{"rendered":"Germany and the EU: Safeguarding the Rule of Law in Troubled Times"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This contribution is part of our joint online symposium with the JuWissBlog<\/a> on the topic: \u201cProtecting the Rule of Law in the European Union \u2013 Mechanisms and National Responsibility.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Click here<\/strong> to view all contribution to our symposium.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A contribution from Dr. E. Prema* and Ragul O.V.*<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The rule of law is enshrined as a core EU value (Article 2 TEU) and a cornerstone of trust among Member States. Yet recent years have seen alarming backsliding in several countries \u2013 notably Poland and Hungary \u2013 raising the question that how can the EU\u2019s existing mechanisms (Article 7, sanctions, judicial review, etc.) uphold shared legal standards, and what role should national actors \u2013 especially Germany\u2019s institutions \u2013 play in this effort? Recent scholarship and policy analysis have examined the EU\u2019s \u201ctoolbox\u201d for enforcing rule-of-law norms, and highlight both progress and glaring gaps. Germany\u2019s own constitutional order, with its entrenched commitment to the Rechtsstaat (rule-of-law) under Article 20 of the Basic Law, suggests a special responsibility for Berlin to champion these values. This article surveys the EU\u2019s current enforcement mechanisms, assesses their effectiveness, and explores Germany\u2019s national responsibility \u2013 from its courts to its votes in Brussels \u2013 in shoring up the rule of law across Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

EU Enforcement Tools: Article 7, Sanctions, and Judicial Review<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU\u2019s primary \u201cnuclear option\u201d for grave rule-of-law breaches is the Article 7 TEU procedure, which can ultimately suspend a Member State\u2019s voting rights. In practice, however, Article 7 has proved almost inert. As one analysis notes, \u201cThere has been no movement on the Article 7 procedure\u201d for years.[1]<\/a> Hungary\u2019s case (triggered in 2018) has barely moved beyond hearings on \u201cthe state of play,\u201d and even now has not reached the stage of determining a formal \u201cserious breach.\u201d Likewise, the Article 7 procedure against Poland was quietly closed in mid-2024 \u2013 not by imposing sanctions, but only after Poland\u2019s newly elected government pledged to reverse its contested judicial reforms.[2]<\/a> In short, Article 7 remains a blunt instrument that member-states are reluctant to deploy against each other. In lieu of Article 7, the Commission has relied on infringement proceedings (Article 258 TFEU) against national laws violating EU obligations. However, infringement cases specifically targeting rule-of-law issues have been relatively rare in the past decade. The overall number of infringement actions has \u201cplummeted\u201d since the early 2000s\u2013 in part due to the Commission\u2019s preference for dialogue over confrontation with reluctant governments.[3]<\/a> Only a few headline cases have resulted in fines. For example, Poland was hit with record penalties in 2021 for its attempt to discipline judges,[4]<\/a> and Hungary was fined in 2024 for asylum-law violations.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But scholars observe that even infringements yield only \u201cpartial\u201d compliance in many cases. In recent years the EU introduced a financial conditionality regime to put economic pressure on rule-of-law offenders. Under Regulation 2020\/2092, the Commission can suspend or withhold EU funding if a Member State violates EU values.[6]<\/a> This tool was used decisively against Hungary. In late 2022 the Commission froze \u20ac6.3\u202fbillion of Hungary\u2019s cohesion funds (and threatened to permanently cancel \u20ac1\u202fbillion more) unless Hungary met strict benchmarks on corruption and procurement. Similarly, \u20ac9.6\u202fbillion of Hungary\u2019s Recovery and Resilience (RRF) funds remains suspended for rule-of-law non-compliance.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Commission also invoked a related mechanism (the \u201chorizontal enabling conditions\u201d in the Common Provisions Regulation)[8]<\/a> to pause disbursements to Poland and Hungary \u2013 \u20ac75\u202fbillion to Poland and \u20ac22\u202fbillion to Hungary were frozen under this rule-of-law tie-in in 2022 alone.[9]<\/a> These measures demonstrate the EU\u2019s ability to translate its values into budgetary leverage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has repeatedly stepped in to enforce core principles of EU law. In European Commission v Republic of Poland (Grand Chamber, Judgment of 24\u202fJune\u202f2019)[10]<\/a>, the Court of Justice held that national measures undermining judicial independence are incompatible with primary EU law, specifically Article\u202f19(1) TEU and Article\u202f47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which guarantees \u201cthe right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, in Commission v. Poland<\/em> (2023) the CJEU held that Polish provisions preventing appellate review of court assignments \u201cviolate EU law, as they undermine judicial independence and the right to effective judicial protection\u201d[11]<\/a>. In other cases, the Court ordered Poland to suspend legislation that retroactively lowered judges\u2019 retirement ages (undermining judicial tenure)[12]<\/a>, and struck down rules that sought to curtail the independence of supreme court chambers.[13]<\/a> In short, CJEU case law strongly reaffirms the primacy of EU law on rule-of-law matters \u2013 but it relies on national courts and officials to implement those judgments domestically. In addition, the EU\u2019s institutions exert political pressure. The European Parliament has passed resolutions denouncing rule-of-law breaches and even linking them to budget approval, although it lacks a formal sanctioning power.[14]<\/a> The Commission now publishes annual Rule-of-Law Reports on each Member State (since 2020) to flag emerging threats. These monitoring tools aim to \u201cnudge\u201d compliance, but critics note that without enforcement they risk being overly diplomatic and politicized.[15]<\/a> Indeed, one observer concludes that despite the expanded toolbox under von der Leyen<\/em>, \u201cthere was no increase in the use of infringement proceedings and no movement on Article 7\u201d, and conditionality measures so far \u201chave failed to \u2018bite\u2019\u201d fully.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

EU Sanctions: Assessing Their Effectiveness<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent research analyses the EU\u2019s sanctions \u201ctoolbox\u201d \u2013 Article 7, infringements, and funding conditionality \u2013 and identifies two key factors for success: the credibility of imposing sanctions, and the economic pain they inflict.[17]<\/a> They find that Article 7 has been thoroughly studied and shown largely ineffective, and that the newer conditionality and infringement routes have only partial effectiveness. In practice, the EU\u2019s actions have sometimes yielded political concessions (e.g. forcing Polish authorities to reverse illiberal laws when budget payments were at stake) but often fall short of systemic reform. It was observed that even bold steps like freezing funds can be blunted by political deals \u2013 for instance, \u20ac10.2\u202fbillion was eventually released to Hungary after nominal judicial reforms and to secure Hungary\u2019s veto-free support on other EU goals.[18]<\/a> In sum, scholars conclude that \u201cinfringement procedures and funding conditionality are only partially effective\u201d at mitigating democratic backsliding.[19]<\/a> The EU has powerful legal and financial tools on paper, but it often lacks the unified political will to apply them rigorously. Political considerations \u2013 from coalition needs within the Commission to member-state alliances in the Council \u2013 frequently dilute enforcement. The result is a patchwork of actions that have increased pressure on rule-of-law offenders, but not yet restored resilient rule-of-law culture in the worst-affected countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

German Constitutional Law: National Safeguards<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Against this EU backdrop, Germany\u2019s Basic Law provides a strong national rule-of-law foundation. Article 20 of the Basic Law identifies the Federal Republic as a \u201cdemocratic and social federal state\u201d and imposes that the legislature must conform to the constitutional order, and all public powers are bound by law and justice. The Basic Law explicitly protects \u201cdemocracy, republicanism, social responsibility, federalism and rule of law\u201d as core state principles (the so-called Ewigkeitsklausel or eternity clause in Article 79(3) BL bars their amendment). The Rechtsstaatsprinzip is thus inviolable: it demands independent courts, separation of powers, legal certainty, and fundamental rights protection at every level of government. German public law is steeped in this tradition, ensuring that even federal states and municipalities must implement laws in ways that respect due process and anti-corruption principles.[20]<\/a> In addition, Article 79(3) (the eternity clause) makes the rule-of-law principle as entrenched as human dignity. This means that German legislators and courts cannot undermine core rights and procedures without violating the constitution. In practice, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, in short: BVerfG) has developed a robust jurisprudence on the Rechtsstaat, striking down legislation for breach of fundamental rights or for lacking judicial guarantees. For example, when reviewing emergency COVID measures or criminal law reforms, the BVerfG has insisted on precise legal bases, proper safeguards, and parliamentary approval for any limits on rights. The overall effect is that Germany\u2019s national legal order remains a strong bulwark against authoritarian backsliding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Germany\u2019s Role in European Rule-of-Law Enforcement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Germany does not face internal rule-of-law abuse of the kind seen in Warsaw or Budapest. Nevertheless, as the EU\u2019s largest member and a leading voice in the Council, Germany wields significant influence on how EU tools are used. The German Federal Constitutional Court has generally accepted the primacy of EU law, provided that EU institutions themselves respect fundamental rights and offer effective remedies. In its landmark 2020 PSPP ruling on the European Central Bank, the BVerfG reminded that EU decisions must meet the \u201cprinciple of proportionality\u201d and be subject to genuine judicial review \u2013 a rule-of-law concern.[21]<\/a> This stance signals that German courts will monitor EU action closely; if they find that an EU measure exceeds its powers (\u201cultra vires\u201d), they have not hesitated to challenge it. In short, Berlin\u2019s judiciary requires the EU to uphold the Rechtsstaat even as it defers to EU law\u2019s overall authority. On the political side, Germany\u2019s federal legislature and government have acted in line with the country\u2019s rule-of-law ethos. German MPs and parties have often taken a firm stance toward Poland and Hungary. Notably, in late 2022 the ruling coalition (SPD\/Green\/FDP) moved a Bundestag resolution urging Chancellor Olaf Scholz to \u201cthoroughly assess\u201d whether Hungary\u2019s reforms genuinely address EU concerns, and to vote for suspending billions in funds if not.[22]<\/a> The motion framed this stance not as punishment but as fulfillment of Hungary\u2019s voluntary commitment to EU values, and as protection of the EU budget from misuse. The German parliament thus explicitly saw itself as a guardian of EU rules. Germany has generally supported using the new conditionality mechanism to withhold funds from backsliding states. Similarly, German officials have publicly declared that protecting the rule of law is vital for the EU\u2019s unity and credibility (e.g. former Chancellor Merkel<\/em> warned that EU skepticism grows if abuses go unchecked). Moreover, Germany\u2019s national bodies must implement and honor EU judicial decisions on rule-of-law issues. If the CJEU orders a state to repeal an illegal law or resume normal judicial procedure, German courts and administrations carry a duty (by the Basic Law\u2019s Article 23 on EU integration) to uphold that ruling across the Union. German courts have often cited EU Charter rights as binding domestically[23]<\/a>; any hint that Poland or Hungary would ignore CJEU orders would likely prompt scrutiny in German legal circles as well. At the same time, the Bundesrat (representing L\u00e4nder governments) participates in EU decision-making; rule-of-law violations in one country can become topics in Bundesrat debates on EU funds distribution, indirectly influencing German federal policy. In sum, Germany\u2019s national responsibility in the rule-of-law dialogue is twofold: first, to model a thriving Rechtsstaat at home, reinforcing the Union\u2019s democratic foundations; and second, to use its political weight in EU institutions to insist on compliance. The German government can vote in the Council for strict enforcement measures (and indeed have signaled willingness to do so), while the German judiciary stands ready to ensure EU instruments are applied consistently. Some analysts have argued that without such national-level backing, the EU\u2019s own tools cannot fully function.[24]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion: A Shared Burden, A Shared Future<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The evidence is clear that no single mechanism is a silver bullet for Europe\u2019s rule-of-law crisis. Article 7 TEU, despite its drama, has yielded little movement beyond formalities. Infringements have produced landmark judgments, but commission enforcement has slackened. The new conditionality regime has teeth on paper \u2013 it persuaded reforms in Poland and briefly starved Hungary of funds \u2013 but its efficacy depends on unified Council action and can be softened by political deals. As one expert notes, \u201cthe EU\u2019s rule of law toolbox is comprehensive\u2026 but what is often missing is the political will to use it effectively\u201d.[25]<\/a> What, then, can be done? Observers suggest that the existing tools must be used proactively and early.[26]<\/a> The Commission should promptly initiate infringement actions or conditionality triggers at the first sign of backsliding, rather than awaiting formal crises. If needed, Article 7 should not be shelved forever; even the threat of it \u2013 if credibly pursued \u2013 may galvanize reform. At the national level, Germany (and other like-minded Member States) must continue pressing for strict implementation of EU rules, even when domestic politics make this uncomfortable. The German Bundestag\u2019s push to tie budget votes to the rule-of-law, and its public declarations of solidarity with EU standards, exemplify this approach. Revisiting the research question, the EU\u2019s legal framework lays down rule\u2011of\u2011law norms, but its success ultimately hinges on member-states- that provide the will and means to enforce them. Germany \u2013 whose Basic Law enshrines the Rechtsstaat, whose courts respect EU primacy (within constitutional limits), and whose government leads within EU institutions \u2013 has a particular role to play. By aligning its national practices (justice, transparency, compliance with Charter rights) with European principles, Germany sets a standard. By using its votes and influence, it helps ensure that EU mechanisms are sharpened rather than blunted. If Berlin seizes this role, it could help transform the partial measures of today into an effective regime of mutual accountability for tomorrow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

*Dr. E. Prema is a professor of law at VIT School of law, Chennai, whose international legal scholarship focuses on the intersection of International law, EU law, sovereignty, and rule-of-law enforcement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

*Ragul O.V. is an international law researcher at the Madras High Court, focusing on the rule of law and EU laws. His work explores how legal pluralism and national courts shape compliance with supranational norms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Zselyke\u202fCsaky<\/em>, The EU and the rule of law: Much movement, little change, Centre for European Reform (07.10.2024)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> European\u202fCommission<\/em>, Poland\u2019s efforts to restore rule of law pave the way for accessing up to\u202f\u20ac137\u202fbillion in EU funds, Regional\u202fPolicy\u202fNewsroom (29.02.2024)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> Zselyke\u202fCsaky<\/em>, The EU and the rule of law: Much movement, little change, Centre for European Reform (07.10.2024)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> Reuters<\/em>, Poland says it will appeal after EU court dismisses complaints over fines, Reuters (05.02.2025)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> Jennifer\u202fRankin<\/em>, ECJ to fine Hungary\u202f\u20ac1\u202fm a day until it complies with EU refugee laws, The\u202fGuardian\u202f(13.06.2024)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> Antonia\u202fBaraggia\/Matteo\u202fBonelli<\/em>, Linking Money to Values: The New Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and Its Constitutional Challenges, German\u202fLaw\u202fJournal (23.03.2022)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> International\u202fMonetary\u202fFund<\/em>\u202f(European\u202fDept), Hungary:\u202f2022 Article\u202fIV Consultation\u202f\u2013 Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Hungary, IMF\u202feLibrary (03.02.2023)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> Zselyke\u202fCsaky<\/em>, Freezing EU funds: An effective tool to enforce the rule of law?, CER\u202fInsights (27.02.2025)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> Bloomberg\u202fNews<\/em>, How\u202fEU\u202fIs\u202fWithholding\u202fFunding to\u202fTry\u202fto\u202fRein\u202fin\u202fHungary,\u202fPoland,\u202fBloomberg\u202f(30.12.2022)<\/a><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a> ECJ, European Commission v. Republic of Poland<\/em>, Judgement of 24 June 2019, Case\u202fC\u2011619\/18, \u202fparas\u202f1\u202fand\u202f4<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> ECJ,\u202fCommission\u202fv\u202fRepublic\u202fof\u202fPoland<\/em>, Judgement of 5 June 2023, Case\u202fC\u2011204\/21, para\u202f601<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a> Matteo\u202fBonelli<\/em>, Infringement\u202fActions\u202f2.0: How to Protect EU Values before the Court of Justice, European Constitutional Law Review (17.03.2022)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/a> Katarzyna Gajda-Roszczynialska<\/em>\/Krystian Markiewicz<\/em>, Disciplinary Proceedings as an Instrument for Breaking the Rule of Law in Poland, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (07.10.2020)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/a> European\u202fParliament, MFF, Rule of Law Conditionality and Own Resources: European Parliament resolution of 17\u202fDecember\u202f2020 on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021\u20112027, the Interinstitutional Agreement, the EU Recovery Instrument and the Rule of Law Regulation European\u202fParliament (17.12.2020)<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15]<\/a> \u202fYlenia\u202fMaria\u202fCitino<\/em>, The Prospective Impact of the Rule of Law Reports: A Tool to Be Fine\u2011Tuned, SpringerLink (22.08.2024)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16]<\/a> Zselyke\u202fCsaky<\/em>, The EU and the rule of law: Much movement, little change, Centre for European Reform (07.10.2024)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[17]<\/a> Adam\u202fHolesch\/Clara\u202fPortela<\/em>, Money\u202fTalks? The\u202fEffectiveness of\u202fSanctions in the \u2018Rule of Law\u2019 Conflict in the European\u202fUnion,\u202fJournal of\u202fCommon Market Studies\u202f(01.07.2025)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[18]<\/a> Patrick\u202fM\u00fcller\/Peter\u202fSlominski<\/em>, Trading vetoes for money \u2013 how Hungary holds EU foreign policy hostage, EUROPP (05.03.2025)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[19]<\/a> Michael\u202fBlauberger\/Daniel\u202fNaurin\/Ulrich\u202fSedelmeier\/Natasha\u202fWunsch<\/em>,\u202fThe\u202fmulti\u2011level\u202fpolitics\u202fof\u202f
countering\u202fdemocratic\u202fbacksliding: state of the art and new research directions,\u202fJournal\u202fof\u202fEuropean\u202fPublic\u202fPolicy\u202f(01.11.2024).<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[20]<\/a> Grundgesetz\u202f[GG] [Basic\u202fLaw] art\u202f28 (1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[21]<\/a>Niels\u202fPetersen\/Konstantin\u202fChatziathanasiou<\/em>,\u202fBalancing\u202fCompetences?\u202fProportionality\u202fas\u202fan\u202fInstrument\u202fto\u202fRegulate\u202fthe\u202fExercise\u202fof\u202fCompetences\u202fafter\u202fthe\u202fPSPP\u202fJudgment\u202fof\u202fthe\u202fBundesverfassungsgericht,\u202fEuropean\u202fConstitutional\u202fLaw\u202fReview\u202f(16.07.2021)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[22]<\/a> Motion of the\u202fSPD,\u202fB\u00fcndnis\u202f90\/Die\u202fGr\u00fcnen\u202fand\u202fFDP,\u202fBT\u2011Drucksache\u202f20\/1640,\u202fpp\u202f1\u20138,\u202fBundestag\u202f(15.11.2022)<\/a>; Bundestag\u202fResolution\u202f(Annex\u202fA),\u202fBT\u2011Drucksache\u202f20\/1640,\u202fpp\u202f9\u201312\u202f(25.11.2022)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[23]<\/a> Marcus\u202fSchnetter<\/em>, Constitutional Courts as Guarantors of EU Charter Rights: A Rhetorical Perspective on Constitutional Change in Austria and Germany, European\u202fConstitutional\u202fLaw\u202fReview (14.05.2024)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[24]<\/a> Nicolai\u202fvon\u202fOndarza<\/em>, The Crisis Governance of\u202fthe\u202fEuropean Union, Stiftung\u202fWissenschaft\u202fund\u202fPolitik (04.09.2023)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[25]<\/a> \u202fZselyke\u202fCsaky<\/em>, The EU and the rule of law: Much movement, little change, Centre for European Reform (07.10.2024)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[26]<\/a> European\u202fParliament<\/em>, Report on the Commission\u2019s\u202f2023\u202fRule\u202fof\u202fLaw\u202freport\u202f(A9\u20110025\/2024), para\u202f77, European\u202fParliament\u202f(01.02.2024).<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Suggested Citation<\/strong>: E. Prema\/Ragul O.V.<\/em>, Germany and the EU: Safeguarding the Rule of Law in Troubled Times, jean-monnet-saar 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

DOI<\/strong>:\u00a010.17176\/20250806-074508-0<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft<\/strong> (DFG, German Research Foundation) \u2013 Project No.: 525576645<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This Saar Brief explores the EU\u2019s rule of law mechanisms \u2013 Article 7 TEU, infringement proceedings, and funding conditionality. While these tools have led to major rulings and applied financial pressure, they often secure only limited compliance. The authors argue that the CJEU\u2019s efforts rely heavily on national courts and that Germany\u2019s legal culture and political influence are central to shaping a more cohesive enforcement regime.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":18,"featured_media":322577,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[959],"tags":[962,316,968,675,969,970,966,967],"class_list":["post-322576","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-online-symposium-protecting-the-rule-of-law-in-the-european-union-mechanisms-and-national-responsibility","tag-art-7-euv","tag-cjeu","tag-courts","tag-eu-law","tag-infringement-procedure","tag-online-symposium-2","tag-online-sympoium","tag-rule-of-law-2"],"cc_featured_image_caption":{"caption_text":"","source_text":"","source_url":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/322576","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/18"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=322576"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/322576\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":322585,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/322576\/revisions\/322585"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/322577"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=322576"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=322576"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=322576"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}