{"id":322853,"date":"2025-11-06T09:12:45","date_gmt":"2025-11-06T08:12:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/?p=322853"},"modified":"2025-11-06T09:24:18","modified_gmt":"2025-11-06T08:24:18","slug":"rethinking-corporate-social-responsibility-in-times-of-armed-conflict","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/?p=322853","title":{"rendered":"Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility in Times of Armed Conflict"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>This contribution is part of our joint online symposium with the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/\">V\u00f6lkerrechtsblog<\/a>&nbsp;on the topic: \u201cTackling Human Rights, Environmental Protection and Business \u2013 A Multilevel Approach\u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/?page_id=322775\">Click&nbsp;<strong>here<\/strong>&nbsp;to view all contributions to our symposium.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A contribution from Ann-Charlotte Neumann<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Amid growing global instability, exacerbated by international armed conflicts such as those between Israel and Palestine and Russia and Ukraine, which contribute to a shift in global power dynamics, companies are increasingly under pressure to assume responsibility. This includes not only environmental and human rights issues, but also their economic activities in states that are accused of or recognized to be violating international law. The traditional understanding of &#8222;geopolitical risks&#8220; as a manifestation of geopolitical instability, in which companies were primarily seen as victims, is increasingly being challenged. There is a growing tendency&nbsp;to view them as active contributors to or amplifiers of that same instability, a notion referred to here as \u201cgeopolitical responsibility\u201d, that can be<a href=\"https:\/\/shs.cairn.info\/revue-internationale-et-strategique-2018-3-page-16?lang=fr\">&nbsp;understood as<\/a>&nbsp;&#8222;the responsibility of companies for the emergence and course of security-related unrest and complex humanitarian catastrophes&#8220;.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With the increasing legal anchoring of corporate responsibility for human rights and environmental concerns in recent years, both at the national and EU level, the issue of the so-called \u201cgeopolitical responsibility\u201c of companies is coming increasingly into focus. Recent developments in the context of international armed conflicts illustrate that corporate economic activities can have direct geopolitical consequences, whether intentional or unintentional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Regardless of whether companies are directly linked to human rights violations in their supply or value chains, their economic activities within a state\u2019s territory, such as paying tax fees, royalties or investments,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s10551-009-0232-8\">can contribute to strengthening that state&#8217;s financial capacity<\/a>. Even without the company\u2019s knowledge or intent, these funds can&nbsp;&nbsp;be used to finance internal repression or armed conflicts (In this sense,&nbsp;\u201cbusiness activities in a conflict-affected area will never be \u2018<a href=\"https:\/\/www.undp.org\/publications\/heightened-human-rights-due-diligence-business-conflict-affected-contexts-guide\">neutral\u2019 and without impact.\u201c<\/a>). Silvie Matelly&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iris-france.org\/ris\/les-entreprises-face-a-la-geopolitique\/\">emphasizes<\/a>&nbsp;that \u201cmoney is the nerve of war\u201d and notes that \u201ccompanies contribute significantly to the wealth of nations and thereby, indirectly, to their military power, directly linked to their activity in international armed conflicts.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the context of the ongoing armed conflict between the Israeli government and&nbsp;Hamas&nbsp;in the Gaza Strip, there is an increasing&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/a-hrc-59-23-from-economy-of-occupation-to-economy-of-genocide-report-special-rapporteur-francesca-albanese-palestine-2025\/\">debate<\/a>&nbsp;about the extent to which economic relationships with Israeli institutions or companies may indirectly contribute to the maintenance of a military campaign.&nbsp;This military campaign&nbsp;was&nbsp;categorised&nbsp;by the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/commission-of-inquiry-report-genocide-in-gaza-a-hrc-60-crp-3\/\">Independent Commission of Inquiry of the UN Human Rights Council on September 16, 2025<\/a>&nbsp;as genocide within the meaning of Article 6 of the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/sites\/default\/files\/2024-05\/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf\">Rome&nbsp;<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/sites\/default\/files\/2024-05\/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf\">Statute of the International Criminal Cour<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/sites\/default\/files\/2024-05\/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf\">t<\/a>&nbsp;(ICC).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this context, the question arises as to which international legal instruments can hold companies accountable or at least oblige them to critically assess their economic activities in light of possible violations of international law.&nbsp;This getsparticularly relevant when companies are operating in states that are accused of serious and systematic breaches of fundamental norms of international law, especially norms of&nbsp;<em>jus cogens<\/em>. This concerns not only existing sanctions regimes, but the question of whether a geopolitical due diligence obligation can be implicitly derived from general human rights due diligence duties, for instance as established under the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/dir\/2024\/1760\/oj\/eng\">Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence<\/a>&nbsp;(\u201cCS3D\u201d). A likewise obligation would require companies to systematically assess the implications of operating in geopolitically sensitive contexts, particularly with regards to potential violations of international law and human rights associated risks.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>\u201cGeopolitical Responsibility\u201c in Soft Law Frameworks and the Limits of Binding International Law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Geopolitical responsibility is not explicitly regulated in non-binding soft law instruments, but it can nonetheless be inferred from several instruments.&nbsp;A reference to geopolitical responsibility can be found in notable frameworks such as the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ilo.org\/about-ilo\/organizational-structure-international-labour-office\/ilo-department-sustainable-enterprises-productivity-and-just-transition\/tripartite-declaration-principles-concerning-multinational-enterprises-and\">Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy<\/a>, issued by the ILO in 1977. It can also be derived from the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.oecd.org\/content\/dam\/oecd\/en\/publications\/reports\/2023\/06\/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct_a0b49990\/81f92357-en.pdf\">OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises<\/a>, adopted as early as 1976 and revised multiple times, as well as from the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/publications\/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf\">UN Guiding Principles&nbsp;<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/publications\/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf\">on&nbsp;<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/publications\/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf\">Business and Human Rights<\/a>&nbsp;and the 2022&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.undp.org\/publications\/heightened-human-rights-due-diligence-business-conflict-affected-contexts-guide\">guidelines of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights for conflict-affected areas<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Article 7 of the UN Guiding Principles reads: \u201cBecause the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in conflict-affected areas, States should help ensure that business enterprises operating in those contexts are not involved with such abuses.\u201d&nbsp;While this rule explicitly establishes only a public duty of care on the part of a state, it implicitly points to an enhanced corporate human rights due diligence obligations in conflict zones. Also, the prescription entails the need to assess whether and how their activities may contribute to the stabilization or escalation of conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Building on this, the 2022 Guide to Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts was published by the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises under the UNDP. The guide offers orientation to businesses on how to meet their responsibilities to carry out a heightened human rights due diligence in conflict-affected areas:&nbsp;\u201cBusiness needs to identify and assess not only actual or potential adverse human rights impacts, but also actual or potential adverse impacts on conflict that the company may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or that may be directly linked to its operations, products or services.\u201d This wording emphasizes that corporate responsibility in conflict contexts is not limited to human rights aspects but also encompasses a geopolitical dimension: companies must assess whether their economic presence or their supply and value chains could contribute to the promotion, stabilization, or escalation of conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Regarding binding norms of international law, there currently exists no legal basis explicitly establishing corporate liability for geopolitically relevant conducts or consequences. However, principles can be inferred from positive international law, in particular from international treaties such as the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which delineates the conditions and limits of individual criminal responsibility within the context of geopolitically significant conflicts. Proceedings before the ICC are indeed aimed at establishing the individual criminal responsibility of a natural person.&nbsp;However, individuals within those companies, such as executives or board members, can be held criminally liable before the ICC if they are found to have contributed to the commission of international crimes (articles 6 to 8bis of the Rome Statute).&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Even though international criminal law does not apply to legal entities, its norms have an effect beyond their narrow scope of application. Norms mark the threshold at which economic activities may stabilize or prolong a situation that is contrary to international law. As such, they can serve as a referential framework for the emerging debate on corporate geopolitical responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Nevertheless, due to the complexity of proving individual criminal responsibility in such cases, the French financial institution BNP Paribas was&nbsp;placed under formal investigation&nbsp;in 2017 as a legal entity before the French Tribunal de grande instance de Paris. In the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.asso-sherpa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/06\/Dossier-de-presse-Sherpa-le-CPCR-et-Ibuka-France-d%C3%A9posent-plainte-contre-BNP-Paribas-sur-le-fondement-de-complicit%C3%A9-de-g%C3%A9nocide-de-crimes-contre-l%E2%80%99humanit%C3%A9-et-de-crimes-de-guerre.pdf\">civil complaint<\/a>, BNP Paribas was accused of complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes through the alleged financing of an arms purchase said to have contributed to the Rwandan genocide in 1994.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The UN Security Council\u2019s arms embargo against Rwanda (Security Council resolution 918), which came into effect in May 1994, represented a clear measure by the international community to address geopolitical responsibility in this conflict. However,&nbsp;rather than serving as a preventive instrument, the&nbsp;embargo&nbsp;operated as a reactive response to the involvement of companies in international crimes.&nbsp;In this context, the role of the EU gains importance, as it increasingly seeks to proactively assume its responsibility in global conflicts through binding measures and regulatory obligations for companies.&nbsp;Additionally, the EU makes use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, as exemplified by the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reg\/2025\/1494\/oj\/eng\">restrictive measures ultimately imposed against Russia<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>A Normative Paradox Between Risk and Regulation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Since EU restrictive measures are generally enacted through directly enforceable regulations, their adoption is&nbsp;contingentupon the political will of Member States. This renders sanctions an instrument of political cohesion. According to Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union, the Council decides unanimously, on the basis of proposals from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on the adoption, extension, or repeal of sanctions regimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The&nbsp;CS3D, adopted on June 13, 2024, after a lengthy European legislative process, is the first EU binding instrument that obliges companies to exercise human rights and environmental due diligence throughout their entire supply chain. In this way, it could lay the foundation for a geopolitically relevant due diligence obligation. However, a fundamental issue arises when companies operate in states where adverse violations of international law occur, although these violations are not linked to the company\u2019s direct or indirect supply chain. Consequently, the provisions of the Directive,&nbsp;specifically&nbsp;those&nbsp;defining&nbsp;the&nbsp;scope&nbsp;of the due diligence obligations (such as articles 3, 6 and 9 CS3D),&nbsp;do not impose an obligation to assess or mitigate geopolitical risks that indirectly arise from the mere economic presence of a company, provided these risks are of a human rights nature and are not directly linked to the company\u2019s supply chain.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Article 8(1) CS3D, as well as the corresponding recital 42, refer to conflict-affected and high-risk areas. These provisions acknowledge that companies operating in such regions are exposed to specific human rights risks and must adapt their due diligence processes to the particular challenges on the ground. They also reference international humanitarian law and relevant guidelines, such as the UNDP\u2019s Guide to Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts. However, this obligation remains limited to a human rights risk perspective and does not encompass the geopolitical dimension of economic presence itself. This is especially so in cases where there is no supply chain link to specific human rights violations, but where an indirect legitimization or support of state conduct in violation of international law could nonetheless be conceivable. The existing due diligence duty focuses on \u201cactual and potential adverse impacts arising from their own operations or those of their subsidiaries and, where related to their chains of activities, those of their business partners.\u201d Thus, there is no clear legal obligation to examine whether the mere economic activity of a company enables, legitimizes, or reinforces the continuation of serious violations of international law. This leads to a regulatory gap that allows companies to operate in conflict areas without considering the broader geopolitical consequences of their presence. Moreover, it enables companies to remain active in states committing serious violations of international law without reflecting on the broader political and security-related implications of their presence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this context, the notion of a potential \u201cgeopolitical responsibility\u201d within the framework of the Directive remains primarily a subject of theoretical debate. However, it reflects an emerging normative expectation of companies to integrate foreign policy considerations into their due diligence systems. Practically, one may speak of a \u201cgeopolitical dimension\u201d of corporate due diligence, which could be characterized as the&nbsp;&nbsp;\u201d<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iris-france.org\/165964-entreprises-quelle-boussole-geopolitique-en-temps-de-guerre\/\">company\u2019s foreign policy<\/a>\u201d. While this concept is not anchored in binding legal norms, it embodies the establishment of the company\u2019s ongoing commitment to its \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iris-france.org\/165964-entreprises-quelle-boussole-geopolitique-en-temps-de-guerre\/\">relationship to the world<\/a>.\u201d Even in the absence of explicit legal obligations, the concept of corporate social responsibility plays a significant role in reinforcing stakeholder trust and mitigating reputational risks amid geopolitical upheavals, provided that companies proactively identify such risks and responsibly disengage from the affected geographical areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In light of the Omnibus Package, presented by the European Commission on February 26, 2025, to simplify the provisions of the CS3D in response to an increasingly challenging global geopolitical and economic environment, the focus appears to be shifting. The question of a possible extension of corporate due diligence obligations is increasingly receding into the background. This legal development exemplifies the influence of the geopolitical situation on legal instruments and highlights a paradox: while the current circumstances would warrant a stronger integration of geopolitical aspects into corporate due diligence obligations, it is precisely this geopolitical uncertainty that is leading to a weakening or postponement of existing obligations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Although multinational companies are endowed with substantive and procedural rights under international investment protection treaties, there exists no corresponding duty under international law adequately addressing their geopolitical responsibility. This discrepancy creates a normative gap and impedes the coherent integration of economic actors into the international legal regime for the maintenance of peace and the protection of human rights. It appears appropriate to revisit and advance the debate on multinational enterprises as subjects. Furthermore, in light of the increasing significance of economic power and political influence of multinational companies in international conflicts, it seems necessary to supplement existing due diligence obligations with a binding duty to assess and mitigate geopolitical risks at the EU-level. Such a preventive framework would serve as a necessary complement to, and could effectively precede, the reactive regime of economic sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Suggested Citation<\/strong>:&nbsp;<em>Ann-Charlotte Neumann<\/em>, Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility in Times of Armed Conflict, jean-monnet-saar 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>DOI<\/strong>:<a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.17176\/20251106-092301-0\"> 10.17176\/20251106-092301-0<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Funded by the&nbsp;<strong>Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft<\/strong>&nbsp;(DFG, German Research Foundation) \u2013 Project No.: 525576645<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This contribution introduces the emerging concept of \u201cgeopolitical responsibility,\u201d arguing that companies can actively shape or intensify international conflicts through their economic activities. It traces how existing soft law instruments, such as the UN Guiding Principles and OECD Guidelines, already call for heightened corporate due diligence in conflict-affected areas. Yet, binding frameworks like the EU\u2019s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive overlook this geopolitical dimension, leaving a growing gap between theory and corporate practice.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":322855,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[983],"tags":[992,492,957,990,174,991],"class_list":["post-322853","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-online-symposium-tackling-human-rights-environmental-protection-and-business-a-multilevel-approach","tag-armed-conflicts","tag-blog","tag-csddd","tag-due-diligence","tag-europarecht","tag-geopolitical-responsibility"],"cc_featured_image_caption":{"caption_text":"","source_text":"","source_url":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/322853","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=322853"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/322853\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":322862,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/322853\/revisions\/322862"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/322855"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=322853"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=322853"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jean-monnet-saar.eu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=322853"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}